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The prudential regulation of banking is now undertaken by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) within 
the Bank of England. Previously, such regulation was undertaken by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
It will be the role of the FSA as the previous regulator in the UK that will be considered. This article will ex-
amine the lack of understanding on the part of the FSA about the risk to which banks were subject. Insights 
into the approach and effectiveness of the FSA can be found in an examination of the reports of various par-
liamentary committees and the evidence of senior officials, employees and management called to give evi-
dence. These committees have investigated various banking collapses and important issues relating to the 
carrying on of banking business. The reports and evidence of such committees are a reliable and detailed 
source of information. These reports are evaluated throughout. It will be suggested that the economic posi-
tion of such banks does have an effect upon their regulation. Analogous reports in the US will be compared 
and contrasted with the findings in the UK. Changes in regulation, and its enforcement, after the setting up of 
the PRA will be considered. 
 
International Banking and Finance 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The collapse of various banking institutions in both the UK and the US, and the reasons for this, have been 
fully canvassed worldwide in newspapers and economic journals. The fallout from this, and concerns about 
these collapses has led Parliament to take a keen interest in banking and financial matters such as the pro-
tection of depositors, banking collapses and the day-to-day prudential regulation of banking and financial 
institutions. Further, Parliament has wanted the regulatory institutions to account to it, including senior offi-
cials and employees working within such institutions. 
Parliament has demonstrated this by being active in calling officials and employees from both the Bank of 
England (then in its role as macro-economic regulator) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (then in its 
role as the prudential regulator for financial and banking activities) to give evidence before it. There is now a 
collection of reports with actual real evidence and questioning by parliamentary committee. These parlia-
mentary reports have gone largely unexplored and in a general sense merit academic scrutiny. The views of 
Parliament and the various experts called to give evidence will be used in this article. They are a reliable and 
consistent source of material that is crucial and relevant to demonstrate the proposition contended above. 
Some of these parliamentary reports are investigations at a general level whilst others are very specific or 
about particular case situations. The focus will be on those parts of those parliamentary reports that make 
comment about the regulators, in particular the FSA. 
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B. Importance and use of parliamentary reports 
 
The institutions and the general banking matters that will be considered are those that have been subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny. They are matters that are important or topical in the eye of Parliament rather than a 
specific set of decisions determined in a logical way. They will be considered in chronological order, or alter-
natively, in a way which highlights important points about failure of regulation on the part of the FSA and to 
attempt to support the proposition that self-regulation leads to poor regulation.1 
The rules governing the system of regulation in England have consistently not allowed the regulator to be 
sued unless there is fraud or misfeasance.2 This has the consequence that there has not been any case law 
or developing case law on the negligence on the part of the English regulatory system.3 Such jurisprudence 
is mainly to be found in the parliamentary reports but with a different dimension. It is not whether a group of 
investors or depositors have suffered loss caused by regulatory failure, but whether the regulator is at a gen-
eral level functioning well and serving the public interest. The parliamentary committees, with their examina-
tion of officials in senior regulatory positions and also of senior management of banks, provide much infor-
mation which would otherwise not appear in the public domain. 
 
C. Methodology 
 
Much is happening in banking. The various parliamentary committees tend to be set up as a reaction to the 
various 
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events that occur. The parliamentary website contains many reports on all areas and any search can be 
narrowed to a search for banking which will indicate the times of recent or imminent parliamentary commit-
tees covering banking matters. The various matters affecting banking and the parliamentary committees are 
covered in the newspapers.4 If one searches the online archive centre of the Financial Times under Andrew 
Tyrie, usually chairperson of the various parliamentary committees covering banking, one will see not only 
the particular reports affecting prudential banking which form the subject matter of this article, but also other 
matters such as his requests for information or letters to the FSA, which may not feature on the official par-
liamentary website. Major prudential failures are the subject of press coverage, which are a form of record as 
to the views about such failure, but also indicate that Parliament will be scrutinising the activities of man-
agement. It follows that it is likely to be the case that senior officials or employees of regulatory institutions 
are also likely to be examined by the relevant parliamentary committee. Sadly there continue to be such fail-
ures so that there is the need for various regulatory officials to justify and explain their actions. The parlia-
mentary committees provide not only an account of what has gone wrong but also a detailed account of the 
failure of management of the relevant bank. The committee will also consider whether there were failings on 
the part of the regulator, and if so in what way(s). The reports of the newspapers have tended to concentrate 
on the failings of management, and are a useful way of confirming the views of the parliamentary committee 
and that there is a consistency of approach and conclusion. Parliament tends to go further, but it is able to do 
so as it will cross-examine senior officials within the regulatory body responsible for regulating the failed 
bank. It is important to note that Parliament has the necessary power(s) to examine such witnesses. Further, 
such witnesses may be asked to provide additional written evidence on relevant matters. This approach is 
useful if the matter is of a wide-ranging nature and requires further investigation. It is suggested that this will 
provide for the accuracy of such replies as witnesses can be recalled and failure to provide answers could 
lead to sanctions comparable with those which could be imposed by the courts. The point is that one is able 
to say that the evidence of witnesses, normally contained in a separate volume, will be cogent, accurate and 
reliable. It is a source of information not otherwise readily obtainable. Furthermore, such reports have to date 
escaped the scrutiny of systematic research. Each report will be described in detail together with any fol-
low-up reports. These reports will then be evaluated. 
 
D. Prudential regulation or self-regulation or meta-regulation 
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It becomes necessary to explain what is meant by meta-regulation, since this term has been used in aca-
demic circles. The term covers any type of regulation but for the purpose of this article it will be confined to 
banking and financial regulation. Those who have developed this theory have identified two parts to it. The 
first part is that there is in place a system of "self-regulation" of banks.5 It has been suggested by Professor 
Julia Black that for this system to work, banks must have the strong wish to take on board public needs and 
not simply be motivated by the wish to maximise profits.6 It is this that has been shown to be problematic in 
that some banks have been motivated only by a desire to maximise profits and not by social considerations. 
A bank will often wish to underestimate the risks to which it is subject, when lending, so as to maximise prof-
its.7 
The second part is that the regulator, previously the FSA, and now the Prudential Regulation Authority (the 
PRA, being responsible for prudential regulation) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) within the Bank 
of England8 are to regulate this self-regulation. The role of the regulators has been criticised in that they have 
lacked the necessary skill and desire to regulate. It is these failings that are the subject of this article. These 
factors of skill and desire on the part of regulators have been identified as necessary for meta-regulation to 
work.9 Meta-regulation theory says that there must be sanctions for failure to comply or rewards for those 
that do comply with the regulatory requirements.10 The approach of the FSA was that, as there were rules 
governing risk,11 that was all that was necessary. The approach of the FSA was to assume that the banks 
were complying with the rules relating to risk. The FSA did not check the substance of matters relating to risk 
and left the issue of risk as a matter to be determined by the banks and not by the FSA.12 
There is also a further link between risk and prudential regulation in that traditionally it has been up to the 
bank to identify and work out the extent of the risk to which it is subject.13 In that sense this has been a mat-
ter for the bank.14 The collapses of banking institutions as a consequence of excessive risk taking or incor-
rect evaluation of the risks to which those institutions were subject feature in the various case situations in 
this article which are the subject of parliamentary scrutiny. There was over-reliance upon the risk models of 
the banks by the regulator,15 and failure of the regulator to assess, independently itself the risks to which 
various banks were subject. The FSA failed to take proper actions to stop the banks from taking excessive 
risk. A slight variant on the theme is put forward by Sharon Gilad16 in an analysis of enforced self-regulation. 
The point is that the regulator, the FSA, failed to take proper enforcement action and the parliamentary re-
ports considered below expand upon this failure. 
In so far as meta-regulation theory assumes or hopes that banks will not wish to maximise profits this has 
simply just not happened. In particular, the HBOS lending, which will be explored below, was expanded at a 
rapid rate in order to maximise returns for the bank without paying sufficient attention to the risks that this 
posed for the bank. With RBS, the bank engaged upon an aggressive strategy of takeover, which 
over-exposed its capital and liquidity positions and without sufficient recognition of the problems that it would 
face in the event of an economic downturn. There is also the problem that meta-regulation theory does not 
feature in any of the reports discussed by Parliament. One wonders about its real value if it not actually used 
by Parliament to evaluate the work previously carried out by the FSA. There is a more serious structural 
point -- the separation of academic and practitioner work and the failure of academic analysis to feature in 
practitioner circles. The matter is, perhaps, better 
[2015] 9(2) LFMR 130-144 at  132 
 
classified as a failure of prudential regulation. What is clear is that there need to be rules which must be 
complied with by banking organisations.17 Further, that these rules are supervised in the sense of there being 
supervision, monitoring and enforcement.18 Some of the major areas of prudential regulation, relevant to the 
subsequent analysis of the parliamentary reports will be considered below. The failings of the FSA to super-
vise, monitor and enforce will be discussed and evaluated below.19 
 
E. Bank capital, liquidity, stress testing and asset quality -- reliance up-
on internal models by the regulator 
 
1. Capital 
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Not only is the capital of banks an important issue but it is one which has attracted the attention and scrutiny 
of Parliament.20 The importance of the maintenance of bank capital and the lack of this during the bank col-
lapses, and financial problems from 2004 onwards has been considered previously by the author of this arti-
cle.21 The regulation of bank capital or perhaps one might say its lack of enforcement is a matter of subse-
quent regret by governments and regulators.22 For this purpose regulation includes the legislation and regu-
latory rules governing bank capital.23 The banking crisis highlighted the lack of attention paid by regulators 
worldwide in the regulation of bank capital.24 Regulators left it to banks to regulate themselves when it came 
to capital. The banks ignored the standards that they were expected to adopt. The regulators in the UK took 
limited action to enforce these capital standards. The approach of the FSA in relation to Basel II and III is 
considered subsequently. 
The Independent Commission on Banking, whose members were called to give evidence before Parlia-
ment,25 has wanted higher standards in relation to the capital reserves of banks.26 The PRA is reported to 
have tested the largest eight lenders through a 3% leverage test in the summer of 2013.27 Professor Julia 
Black confirms that Basel III is metaregulation but importantly a situation where banks "were allowed to use 
their own internal risk models to provide the basis for setting their capital requirements".28 She makes the 
point that this will always be the case, and that regulators will be "reliant"29 on such internal risk models of 
banks. She regards this as a "fundamental weakness"30 in that such models are designed for the benefit of 
banks rather than those of the regulator.31 The theory of reliance is confirmed in practice.32 Reliance by the 
regulator was confirmed in relation to Basel III. The regulator will necessarily rely upon the internal models of 
the bank. 
 
2. Liquidity 
 
Further, there was a failure to deal with liquidity matters and the focus upon capital under Basel II and III dis-
tracted regulatory attention away from the issues of liquidity that really did matter. As we shall see in relation 
to the collapse of HBOS this distraction and lack of focus by the FSA was actually a contributory reason for 
the collapse of that bank.33 In particular, and it is documented below,34 there was an incorrect focus upon 
capital at the expense of consideration of the liquidity issues affecting banks.35 This led to regulatory inertia 
on a national and international basis. Regulators failed to take sufficient steps in relation to the liquidity of 
banks and over-concentrated upon capital standards. In the view of Parliament, this was an incorrect focus.36 
This lack of focus on liquidity matters by the FSA is an important matter highlighted in the studies involving 
Northern Rock, HBOS and RBS. 
 
3. Stress testing 
 
There was also a lack of stress testing. This might have helped in relation to liquidity. This is admitted as a 
failing by the FSA in relation to its regulation of Northern Rock.37 After the bank collapses the approach of 
regulators has changed. Post the bank collapses, banks have stress tested more often, taking into account 
unemployment rates and house prices.38 Banks did not appear to be looking at their liquidity positions should 
there be a general economic downturn or indeed specific problems in relation to particular countries. Once 
the banks realised that regulators were taking the matter seriously, then some banks did supply information 
by which they did fail the stress test, and there was greater compliance and greater transparency on the part 
of virtually all the banks.39 That there was a lack of supervision and enforcement in relation to both Basel II 
matters, and liquidity matters and asset quality on the part of the FSA has been confirmed by the FSA it-
self:40 "We have been on a journey towards a tougher style of supervision in all sorts of ways. That has a 
tougher style in relation to issues of substance like capital liquidity asset quality." 
Hector Sants, then Chief Executive of the FSA, in giving evidence to the Treasury Select Committee in the 
October 2007 Hearings, looking at the Advanced Risk Responsive Operating Framework (ARROW)41 risk 
assessment model used by the FSA to assess risk, also pointed out that the FSA needed to look "more 
carefully" at stress testing matters when giving evidence about the FSA's use of ARROW42 in relation to the 
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collapse of Northern Rock. Professor Joanna Gray, writing about the collapse of Northern Rock considers 
that there were "real and significant failures in FSA's own supervision of Northern Rock".43 
In order to properly appreciate what went wrong and to learn the lessons from the failings of the FSA, the 
Northern Rock parliamentary report(s), the HBOS parliamentary report(s), the RBS parliamentary report(s) 
and the Libor parliamentary report(s) all need to be examined fully and their findings looked at in some detail. 
The FSA's "failure to pay sufficient attention to prudential matters"44 will be discussed below. 
 
F. Northern Rock -- the failure of the FSA to appreciate collapse of the 
wholesale funding market 
 
The parliamentary report45concludes, in its summary, that the FSA "systematically failed in its regulatory du-
ty"46 regarding 
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Northern Rock and the problems it posed for systemic risk. A number of failings on the part of the FSA were 
identified. In particular the FSA: (i) failed to identify the weakness in the Northern Rock funding model;47 (ii) 
granted a waiver as regards capital requirements to Northern Rock and allowed it to pay a dividend when the 
FSA was concerned about liquidity problems in the banking sector;48 (iii) adopted an inadequate approach to 
liquidity matters as the regulatory system on this was "flawed";49 (iv) failed to adequately stress test Northern 
Rock properly by failing to stress test the consequences of a complete freezing of the international wholesale 
borrowing markets:50 
 
 
"... we did not engage in our supervised process in a way to my satisfaction with regard to the stress 
testing scenarios, because the stress testing scenarios which they were operating did not envisage 
the set of circumstances that transpired in August, which was a complete closure to them of all rea-
sonable funding mechanisms, ... but I think as a regulator we should have engaged with that in an ex-
treme stress test."51 
 
 
 
Parliament's conclusion, also contained in its summary, was that the FSA "did not supervise Northern Rock 
properly. It did not allocate sufficient resources or time ... The failure of Northern Rock was also a failure of 
its regulator ...".52 The FSA then subsequently produced an internal report into its alleged failings as high-
lighted by Parliament. This was a starting point where Parliament had specifically criticised the approach of 
the FSA in its failure to properly and adequately assess the risks to which a bank was subject. The lack of 
stress testing of the liquidity positions of banks was confirmed by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards in relation to HBOS.53 "There was also an absence of forward looking stress testing of liquidity 
scenarios ...".54 
The failings of the FSA in relation to lack of stress testing of Northern Rock's liquidity scenarios were sadly 
repeated in relation to HBOS, discussed in the section covering HBOS below. 
 
1. Internal report by the FSA into its failings in relation to Northern Rock 
 
The internal report of the FSA55 raised a number of criticisms about the way that the FSA had acted in rela-
tion to its regulation of Northern Rock. Although Northern Rock lending was growing rapidly, this was not 
factored into any extra risk assessment on the part of the FSA.56 The indications of rapid expansion by 
Northern Rock should have led the FSA to reassess Northern Rock's business risk and to return to "more 
pro-active supervision".57 A specific identified error on the part of the FSA was that it did not properly analyse 
the risks associated with the Northern Rock business model.58 Despite several FSA visits to Northern Rock 
in relation to Northern Rock's application for a waiver in relation to Basel59 there were no changes to North-
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ern Rock's risk profile.60 The conclusion was that, by end of the relevant period, there were failings in relation 
to stress testing and liquidity issues.61 
This report mirrors the view of Parliament generally as shown in the various bank failures considered in this 
article. In particular, that insufficient attention was paid by the FSA to liquidity matters, and also that the FSA 
failed to require banks to stress test in relation to liquidity matters. These failures are themes running through 
the whole article and it is important to emphasise this, particularly as this liquidity has not been highlighted to 
such extent and with such importance elsewhere.62 These failings are in relation to risk, risk assessment, 
liquidity and stress testing. A further failing on the part of the FSA was that as Northern Rock was a high im-
pact bank, the level of oversight and engagement fell below the appropriate standard.63 There was a lack of 
formal records of FSA meetings with management and this was regarded as not complying with usual prac-
tice.64 
An interesting point to make here is that Parliament reached its conclusions and afterwards, the FSA made 
an internal report. The Treasury Select Committee in reaching its conclusions, described above, did not 
comment upon this internal report of the FSA which was made subsequent to its assessment. In terms of 
later regulatory failings on the part of the FSA (below), the approach of Parliament was to require the FSA to 
prepare a report into its failings which Parliament would then comment upon. Parliament would then appoint 
specialist advisors to make detailed comments. The internal report by the FSA into the collapse of RBS 
makes clear that the specialist advisors, Bill Knight and Sir David Walker offered their comments upon the 
report at its draft stage. Their comments were "considered" by the review team of the FSA.65 
This intervention by Parliament has been further extended in the HBOS inquiry, discussed below. The FSA is 
to provide the expert reviewers, Stuart Bernau, Iain Cornish and Sir Nicholas Monck with drafts of the FSA 
report.66 Those appointed, if they consider it appropriate, are able to "invite the FSA to reconsider aspects of 
the report before it is published". 67 Thus there has been a development of parliamentary powers. This has 
resulted in increased ability to scrutinise the workings of the FSA by experts with specialised relevant expe-
rience and knowledge. 
 
2. Evaluation of the Northern Rock situation and the report on Northern Rock 
 
Although Northern Rock was expanding and the risks that it was taking also increasing, the regulator did not 
adjust its approach. In particular, there was a lack of challenge by the FSA of the financial decisions and ap-
proach being taken by senior Northern Rock management.68 The FSA failed to challenge the information be-
ing provided to it by Northern Rock.69 In particular the FSA showed a "lack of capacity to assess the quality 
of the data received".70 One also gets a feeling that the internal report was made at quite a low level within 
the organisation, with parts crossed out and a very detailed look at the particular bank without putting it into 
any general analysis and how it would then actually affect the work of the FSA in its attitude and response to 
risk. Further, the lessons about maintaining liquidity were not learnt and the failure of the bank to stress test 
for the 
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important areas that the business was dependent upon were repeated later on by the FSA in relation to 
HBOS and RBS. There needed to be a fundamental reassessment about risk by the FSA, and this did not 
happen. 
 
G. HBOS and its collapse -- failure of the regulator to assess the risks 
and the growth of risks being taken by HBOS 
 
The collapse of HBOS became the subject of a parliamentary report.71 The role of the FSA was examined in 
section 5: A failure of regulation. Having gathered much information the parliamentary report notes72 that the 
FSA gave increased freedom for management itself to identify, assess and control the risks to which HBOS 
was subject. The control of risk was to be a matter of self-regulation. Indeed, a letter was produced in evi-
dence which made clear that the FSA was expecting HBOS to stress test and carry out appropriate analysis 
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of its important dependencies.73 Subsequently, the regulatory emphasis on the part of the FSA shifted to-
wards capital matters relating to HBOS and the implementation of Basel. HBOS was seeking to establish a 
position whereby the FSA would agree and allow HBOS to hold a lower level of capital. Management of the 
bank gave evidence to Parliament that the focus of the regulator moved towards the capital of HBOS and 
away from the liquidity of HBOS.74 
The conclusion of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Fourth Report) was that the regula-
tion by the FSA in relation to HBOS was inadequate,75 and that the regulator missed opportunities to prevent 
the downfall of HBOS76 because it wrongly focused on matters relating to capital rather than liquidity77 and 
with too much attention paid to irrelevant mattes.78 Failure to deal with liquidity was also compounded by 
failure on the part of the FSA to stress test. This failure is a matter which has been dealt with earlier on.79 
In particular, the FSA did not follow through its concerns about the aggressive growth of HBOS and the de-
pendency by HBOS upon wholesale funding.80 The conclusion of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (Fourth Report) was that:81 
 
 
"Too much supervision was undertaken at too low a level -- without sufficient engagement of the sen-
ior leadership within the FSA. The regulatory approach encouraged a focus on box-ticking which de-
tracted from consideration of the fundamental issues with the potential to bring the bank down." 
 
 
 
The point is that the FSA left the matter about the risks to which HBOS was subject, to HBOS and HBOS did 
not adequately control those risks. Thus, prudential regulation failed, although in this case it was not the sole 
reason leading to the collapse of HBOS. However, this conclusion by the Parliamentary Commission adds 
very little that is new. Professor Julia Black had commented in 2005,82 with regard to the assessment of risk, 
that regulators had to reject the approach of box ticking.83 She added the further point that the employees of 
the FSA had been criticised by the Practitioner Panel for not adopting a strong enough risk-based approach 
to its regulation. 84 This view has been confirmed by Andrew Bailey whose view was summarised by the Par-
liamentary Commission on Banking Standards (First Report) as: "a tick-box culture amongst regulators 
meant that so long as firms complied with the rules, they were allowed to continue with practices that led to 
poor standards".85 
Similarly, in the view of Peter Cummings, former CEO of HBOS who gave evidence before the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards (First Report): 
 
"... If they see me doing something about advance portfolio management, that is a tick in the box. If 
they see me doing something about a programme or a project about operational risk, and I set up a 
project management team to manage the operational risk project, and so on, that is a tick in the box 
for them."86 
 
 
 
However, Lord Turner gave evidence before the Banking Commission on Banking Standards. He was: 
 
"... not totally convinced that this use of the word box ticking is the best characterisation of what went 
wrong ... I could argue that one or two ticks or crosses against some very important boxes -- such as 
sensible liquidity and capital rules -- might have been better than what we were doing ..."87 
 
 
 
1. Oral evidence before the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Sub- Committee B) Panel on HBOS (Tuesday 30 
October 2012, HC 705-i) interviewed senior management involved in the risk side of the HBOS business. It 
was pointed out by Lord Turnbull (chairperson) that one of the reasons for interviewing employees was to 
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ascertain what warnings should have been given by the FSA which were not given by them.88 The Head of 
Regulatory Risk, HBOS 2004, pointed out that the ARROW risk assessment by the FSA, in 2003 was seri-
ous and that he had never seen one as serious as that.89 He agreed with the statement of Lord Turnbull, 
that, post- 2006, the FSA allowed two to three years of aggressive selling and lending to be continued.90 
Subsequently, the CEO International of HBOS gave evidence. In his evidence he was of the view that the 
internal funding plan produced by the bank did not foresee that the ability to borrow funds from the market 
would freeze.91 It was also confirmed by another witness, the Group Risk Director, that HBOS had not stress 
tested for the loss of ability to borrow funds in the wholesale market.92 "That [reliance by HBOS on wholesale 
funding] was never raised, for instance, by the FSA as a key risk to the business. I was not ever aware of 
that being in a specific stress test or whatever".93 The questioning marks an important development in that 
the witnesses were questioned by counsel.94 This confirms an important failing on the part of the FSA which 
would not otherwise be documented. 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Sub-Committee B) Panel on HBOS (Monday 12 No-
vember 2012, HC 705-ii) (Panel on HBOS) interviewed senior 
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management employed by HBOS. It was pointed out by Lord Turnbull (chairperson) that a reason for wishing 
to interview such employees was that the collapse of HBOS and the failings of the FSA had not been written 
up by the FSA in the way that had been done for RBS.95 Again, the witnesses were questioned by counsel.96 
The view of the CFO of HBOS, at the relevant time, was that it was not possible to stress test the depth of 
the financial crisis.97 Further in that employee's view, steps were taken by HBOS to deal with the points 
raised by the FSA Group ARROW Risk Assessment concerning HBOS.98 Another witness, the Finance Di-
rector of HBOS, at the relevant time, made the point that the FSA "would then ask for either a further stress 
test to be performed or indeed sometimes further information...".99 In his view what brought about the down-
fall of the bank was the complete closure of the wholesale markets, which was a matter not foreseeable by 
either the bank or the FSA.100 It was "such an extreme scenario that it was just not foreseeable ...".101 
A similar view was put forward by Sir James Crosby, Chief Executive, HBOS between 2001 and 2005, when 
examined by Rory Phillips QC: "The financial crisis as it emerged was a stress test beyond anything anyone 
had considered".102 He made the further point that: "no-one was stress testing for complete closure of the 
markets".103 In the course of questioning Sir James Crosby, Lord Turnbull, the questioner, made an im-
portant observation: 
 
 
"What you are coming to is a different story, which is the FSA having discovered precisely the two 
weaknesses that brought you down. One was a risky asset, particularly in corporate. The second was 
the funding model. Having found the treasure, you then buried it again and did not find it until 2007, 
and that is a problem of regulatory failure, which we as a Commission will need to investigate. But the 
warning signs were there."104 
 
 
 
The view of Parliament is that the FSA failed to spot matters it should have spotted. The Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards (Sub-Committee B) Panel on HBOS (Friday 16 November 2012, HC 
705-iii) heard evidence from the CEO, Corporate and Treasury, HBOS. He was employed by HBOS between 
2001 and 2005. He was also examined by counsel. He indicated that there was a comprehensive dialogue 
between HBOS and the FSA regarding its commercial property book. In the view of the witness, the result of 
intervention by the FSA would be that either HBOS would respond and change or the FSA would withdraw 
its suggestion.105 Lord Turnbull (chairperson) then indicated that there was a time lag during this period when 
the FSA did not do anything in particular in relation to HBOS: 
 
"The Theme we are following is that there is a strong challenge from the FSA. Then there is the 
PWC's skilled persons report. Then there appears to be a kind of reconciliation between the two of 
you. You then have the Paul Moore episode and KPMG basically says it is alright to continue. Then 
somewhere in 06 this must have been after your time -- the FSA come back again. Again they are 
talking to HBOS as though you are not in special measures any more. Then you get to 2012 and they 
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write this thing saying your risk systems were completely inadequate and your successor and col-
league gets very severely dealt with ..."106 
 
 
 
The witness, George Mitchell, did not agree: 
 
"... the FSA was not suggesting that the controls in place were unreasonable. What they were saying 
was that the controls in place were unreasonable to cope with the level of growth that took place in 
2007. So I don't think it is quite as large a contradiction as that."107 
 
 
 
Subsequently, Parliament called an unidentified official from the FSA to explain the approach of the FSA in 
its regulation of HBOS. Again counsel was used to examine the witness.108 The official confirmed that as a 
consequence of its focus HBOS "significantly termed out its funding requirements"109 and "also diversified its 
funding sources"110 both at source and geographically. Before the financial crisis the approach of the FSA 
was to ensure that HBOS had a diverse set of funds and did not lay down specific levels of funding.111 Fur-
ther, the approach of the FSA, before the financial collapse, was not to make a detailed assessment of the 
quality of the underlying assets contained within the books.112 The view of Lord Turnbull, chairperson of that 
parliamentary committee, was that the type of lending of HBOS and its funding model were crucial matters 
that "the FSA missed ... just as much as the company".113 The answer of the FSA official to this question was 
"Yes".114 The point is that the regulatory failure of the FSA is being classified as one of negligence. It is un-
clear whether these errors could now be continued by the PRA in its prudential regulation.115 
Several matters emerge. First, that there is a fragmentation of proceedings in Parliament with the coverage 
of HBOS the subject of different reports. Second, the use of specialist counsel to put very detailed lines of 
questions to the various witnesses adds detail, importance and reliability to the answers given. Third, an em-
ployee working within the FSA was questioned by counsel. This employee was responsible for the 
day-to-day prudential supervision of HBOS. Such information is not usually obtainable since the day-to-day 
work behind the scenes of the FSA is not normally the subject of litigation. Fourth, Parliament wanted to con-
firm that there were failings within the regulator of its prudential regulation of HBOS. Once this was estab-
lished it would lead on to the FSA making a detailed and further report about its errors and omissions as had 
been provided in relation to RBS.116 
 
2. The FSA report into its failings in relation to the loan book of HBOS 
 
In the light of its findings, Parliament has asked Stuart Bernau, Ian Cornish and Sir Nicholas Monck to review 
the report that the FSA is currently preparing about the failure of HBOS. The report will focus on the loan 
book of HBOS.117 As part of this process, the FSA is to provide the reviewers with drafts of its reports. Where 
the draft report of the FSA is significantly altered, then the Treasury Select Committee is to be informed.118 
This marks an important change of approach from whether the FSA has fallen below the 
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standards expected of it to the various way(s) in which the FSA has fallen below the standards expected of it. 
The assumption is that more should have been done by the FSA. 
 
3. Evaluation of the parliamentary report on HBOS 
 
Two failings, in particular were identified. The failure to stress test was repeated showing that the regulator 
had failed to learn and implement the lessons of Northern Rock. Second, the failure to tackle the increase in 
risk to which HBOS was subject. The point is the changes in size and culture amongst the banking commu-
nity. Banks are multinational entities operating on a world stage. Such organisations are prepared to take 
increasing risks. They have not wanted to lower their appetite for profit maximisation. On the contrary, HBOS 
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being an example -- they have shown a desire to ever increase their risk. With HBOS this growth and expan-
sion was not challenged effectively by the FSA. In this one-sided world the banks have moved backwards, 
but the regulator's attitude and approach are unchanged. The suggestion, an idealistic hope perhaps, that 
meta-regulation as put forward by Professor Julia Black would mean that banks would curtail their desire to 
maximise profits and take risk has not happened. 119 HBOS took ever increasing risks at consistent steps, 
and as part of a deliberate policy. In contrast the FSA did not take a more aggressive stance to this change 
in approach to risk on the part of HBOS. If these lessons are to be learnt the PRA will need to re-evaluate its 
approach to risk and will need to adjust its attitude. Not only will the PRA have to demonstrate more under-
standing of the risks being taken by a particular bank, but it will need to step in and demand changes of 
those banks that it seeks to regulate. This will require increasing understanding, will and desire on its part. 
The focus of criticism against the FSA surfaced in relation to the Northern Rock collapse. It was the first col-
lapse of a high street bank. Parliament was able to show, and the FSA agreed, that the FSA's lack of en-
forcement in relation to prudential matters was incorrect and needed change.120 The academic discussion 
about Parliament has focused on what Parliament had to say about Northern Rock.121 The near collapse of 
HBOS and the failure of the prudential regulation in relation to that bank did not attract a similar volume of 
academic discussion. The failure with HBOS, as Parliament points out, was for two reasons. One was the 
inability of HBOS to obtain funding. This is similar to the problems facing Northern Rock. However, the sec-
ond reason was the expansion of HBOS which went unchecked by the FSA. This is clearly a prudential fail-
ing on the part of the FSA and merits consideration in its own right. It was never fully explained why the FSA 
let matters develop the way they did and why, having spotted problems, it did not take action and allowed 
HBOS to continue its expansion of lending. The much debated too big to fail is here, too big to regulate. 
HBOS wanted to expand rapidly in order to maximise its profits. The regulator did not seem willing to match 
this reckless expansion with appropriate action. Negligence is one thing but it may be that the regulator 
lacked the will to tackle, head on, one of the larger banks. It was not fully or adequately explained as to why 
it did not act.122 Now that financial stability is a specific objective, it should lead to a more proactive prudential 
approach.123 It will also lead to the regulator identifying systemic banks of importance and giving them addi-
tional attention.124 
 
4. Further lessons to be learned 
 
There is to be a review as to the failings of HBOS125 to describe and explain why HBOS failed and also to 
describe and explain the supervision of HBOS. This review will take place in the future and necessarily can-
not form part of this article. The review will also assess the enforcement investigations carried out by the 
FSA in relation to the failure of HBOS. It will also look at the wider aspects of the RBS collapse not consid-
ered in the report of the FSA into the failure of RBS.126 It will also make recommendations not covered by the 
FSA's own internal report into the failure of Northern Rock127 and the Turner Review.128 In particular, Andrew 
Green QC has been appointed to assess the FSA's enforcement (or lack of it) in relation to HBOS. The re-
view has specific scope to consider whether the PRA/FSA should bring prohibition proceedings against for-
mer members of HBOS's senior management.129 
 
H. The collapse of RBS -- lessons not learnt for the third time 
 
The collapse of RBS, after its takeover of ABN AMRO, has also been a matter that has attracted a House of 
Commons Treasury Committee report.130 
 
1. Report by the FSA of its alleged failure of its regulation of RBS 
 
As a consequence of criticism of the FSA by Parliament of its regulation of RBS, and at the behest of Andrew 
Tyrie,131 the FSA produced its own report. As this report is specifically reviewed by Parliament, this report will 
be analysed and discussed in detail. Some of the main findings of this internal report by the FSA are outlined 
below. 
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The internal report makes clear, and re-emphasises the point that the supervisory approach of the FSA was 
not adequate as regards the core prudential issues concerning capital liquidity and asset quality.132 Also, the 
FSA failed to challenge risk assessments and management decisions.133 Further, insufficient resources were 
devoted by the FSA to enable the FSA to undertake such an intensive and challenging approach.134 There 
was a deliberate policy of low priority to liquidity, which the FSA accepted, with hindsight, was "inade-
quate".135 The review points out that in relation to capital the approach of the FSA was "reactive".136 In par-
ticular, the acquisition by RBS of ABN AMRO increased the dependence of RBS on short-term wholesale 
funding. The review indicates that the FSA frameworks in relation to the supervision of liquidity issues "were 
not adequate to identify and limit this dependence".137 The review also 
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indicates that the FSA adopted "a relatively low priority in relation to liquidity"138 and that this approach was 
incorrect as liquidity was an important matter central to good supervision. 139 RBS expanded its lending in 
commercial property but the FSA failed to analyse the quality of these loans.140 The conclusion on this was 
clear: 
 
 
"...the FSA's overall philosophy and approach was flawed. There was insufficient focus on the core 
prudential issues of capital and liquidity, and inadequate attention was given to key business risks and 
asset quality issues."141 
 
 
 
As regards the ABN AMRO acquisition by RBS142 the FSA was not sufficiently engaged in testing the liquidity 
and capital consequences for RBS of the acquisition.143 Second, it did not sufficiently challenge the due dili-
gence that RBS carried out144 (which was in fact defective in scope and depth).145 Third, the FSA did not 
have a defined approach in relation to takeovers.146 Fourth, the FSA wrongly relied upon the internal busi-
ness model and internal decision-making within RBS.147 Fifth, the FSA wrongly assumed that RBS would be 
able to manage the acquisition from a capital viewpoint,148 which proved incorrect, despite a rights issue. 
Sixth, the FSA believed that RBS could only run into liquidity difficulties in an "extreme scenario" which was 
considered to be "very unlikely". This view was shown to be wrong.149 Seventh, in dealing with takeover situ-
ations, the approach of the FSA should be more intrusive.150 
The internal report prepared by the FSA continued to deal with some of the failures of management at RBS 
but also failures of the FSA as regulator. The internal report confirms that the FSA concentrated on capital 
requirements but did not look at the leverage on the RBS balance sheet.151 The focus of the FSA was too 
narrow and the FSA supervision team's model (VaR model) that was used did not enable that team to suffi-
ciently understand the risks connected with RBS's trading.152 In particular, too little attention was placed on 
liquidity matters by the FSA so that the supervisory framework for this (the SSR) was "seriously flawed".153 
Liquidity issues were given low priority, with too much attention paid to capital matters.154 In particular the 
SSR did not cover RBS's dependence upon wholesale funding.155 
The internal report also confirmed that the supervisory approach of the FSA was deficient in that it only 
wanted to act in reaction to a problem relating to liquidity.156 This was, as the internal report notes, despite 
previous concerns with the SSR in relation to liquidity matters as identified in the Northern Rock report.157 
Although the FSA took an increasing interest in liquidity matters, the internal report notes that this proved too 
late to save RBS.158 
The internal report notes another failing on the part of the FSA, namely its limited analysis of the balance 
sheet and the asset quality of RBS. In particular, the FSA failed to follow through the major increase in ex-
posure due to RBS's level of commercial property lending and did not intervene in relation to this.159 Further, 
the approach of the FSA was that of allowing the firm to monitor itself by stress testing, namely 
self-regulation, rather than any substantive regulation.160 
 
"... the focus was primarily on encouraging the firm to improve its own stress-testing methodologies. 
This focus on management process for assessing asset quality, rather than substantive analysis by 
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the FSA of a firm's asset composition and quality ... was characteristic of the FSA's pre-crisis supervi-
sory approach."161 
 
 
 
Given the increase in commercial lending by RBS, the supervision team incorrectly failed to review their ear-
lier judgement that stress testing was sufficient. The internal report of the FSA concluded the FSA's inability 
to revisit its earlier judgement was "a weakness in the FSA's supervision".162 Again this type of weakness 
had previously been shown and identified in the earlier internal report of the FSA in relation to Northern 
Rock.163 
The internal report then considers the regulation of RBS's structured credit by the FSA. The conclusion is 
that there were three failures in relation to it.164 The first failure is a too narrow focus by the FSA on individual 
institutions rather than systemic risks so that the development of the market for this was not looked at by the 
FSA.165 The second failure was the approach of the FSA to assessing risks in the trading books of RBS.166 
The third failure was the approach by the FSA to investment banking activities -- an approach which was 
considered to be very limited.167 This reflected the self-regulatory nature of FSA regulation, which was "not to 
challenge firms' business models and their inherent risks, but instead to focus on systems and controls".168 In 
particular, the FSA did not challenge the overall approach taken by RBS, prior to 2007.169 The FSA did not 
focus on the credit risks contained within the trading book of RBS.170 
Given the significance and size of the acquisition by RBS of ABN AMRO, the overall response of the FSA 
was inadequate.171 The FSA had no specific approach to important takeovers.172 Further, "the prevailing FSA 
philosophy and approach were that strategy, business model and key business decisions were matters for 
firms' senior management and boards",173 which the conclusion stated was a "significant mistake".174 How-
ever, because of the size of the acquisition, which was the biggest in banking history, the FSA should have 
exercised its judgement and should have considered whether the risk being taken by RBS was accepta-
ble.175 Although the FSA did have concerns about the liquidity of RBS should the takeover of ABN AMRO 
take effect, it was considered "very unlikely"176 that those risks would materialise.177 The conclusion of the 
internal review team of the FSA was that the FSA had taken "limited account of the very substantial uncer-
tainties and risks".178 
An important conclusion was that too much attention had been paid by the FSA, in its regulation, to capital 
matters. In future, in line with the recommendation of the Turner Review179 equal attention must be paid to 
both liquidity as well as the capital of banks180 and also, when the FSA stress tests banks.181 The FSA con-
firms that its weakness as a regulator was that it relied upon the senior management running the bank, 
namely self-regulation, to ensure that the bank was controlling its risks. What the FSA failed to do was to 
make its own enquiries.182 The approach of the FSA was one that focused on process, systems and struc-
tures, which "tended to be at the expense of focused, detailed and quantitative attention to the core pruden-
tial issues".183 The philosophy of the FSA was not to question the overall strategy of the 
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bank.184 Those individuals responsible for regulation did not reach their own judgements on the strategic 
risks of the bank's business model.185 There was also the concentration by the FSA on the treatment of con-
sumers by firms instead of prudential matters, which the internal review confirmed were regarded "as more 
pressing and important".186 This failure was confirmed from the analysis of the Risk Committee minutes of 
which the November 2005 Risk Committee was looked at.187 There was also the failure to bring prudential 
matters before the FSA board. The minutes of the FSA board between January 2006 and July 2007 which 
were looked at: as regards major matters one out of 61 related to prudential risks; as regards matters within 
the CEO's report only one out of 110 matters related to prudential risks; of 229 items reported by the man-
aging director of retail markets (who was responsible for major banking groups such as RBS) there were five 
items relating to prudential issues.188 
The lack of focus on prudential matters was confirmed by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Stand-
ards. 
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"Prudential risk issues appeared to be scarcely on the FSA Board's radar screen. According to the 
FSA's Report, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, an analysis of the FSA's Board minutes 
during the 19 months prior to the financial crisis showed that of the major topics discussed, only one 
out of 61 related in some way to bank prudential risks, just one out of 110 items reported to the FSA 
Board within the CEO's report were prudential issues, and of 229 items reported by the Managing Di-
rector of Retail Markets to the Board, only five were prudential issues189 ... In their report into the fail-
ure of RBS, the FSA accepted that prudential supervisors did not sufficiently assess and challenge 
key strategic decisions and business model risks. As a result, banks were able to adopt aggressive 
growth strategies aimed at maximising short term profits."190 
 
 
 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (First Report) reviewed the internal FSA report and 
made comments in relation to it: 
 
"The FSA pointed out in their Report, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland, that failings were the 
result, in part, of a 'light-touch' approach to regulation which arose from 'a sustained political emphasis 
on the need for the FSA to be "light touch" in its approach and mindful of London's competitive posi-
tion.' That same report identified deeper failings, both to look at the right issues and to draw lessons 
from the issues they did examine, which can be summarised as a neglect of prudential risk and putting 
form before substance in conduct regulation."191 
 
 
 
2. The report of Parliament about the report by the FSA into its alleged failure of its 
regulation of RBS 
 
As will be seen, it has become common for Parliament to request the FSA to make an internal report and for 
Parliament to appoint specialist advisors who would then review the internal FSA report. Subsequently, Par-
liament appointed two specialist advisors, Sir David Walker and Bill Knight to review the report by the FSA 
into its alleged failure of regulation of the RBS bank.192 Bill Knight concluded that, in general, the employee 
staff of the FSA carried out their duties as expected, but that what was expected of them was wrong. This 
was a failure of senior management.193 
 
 
"The FSA Report describes failures and inadequacies in the regulation and supervision of capital, li-
quidity, asset quality and a failure appropriately to analyse the risks relating to the ABN AMRO acqui-
sition. This is a serious indictment of both senior management and leadership ..."194 
 
 
 
The funding of ABN AMRO by RBS was by debt and it had the consequence that RBS was increasingly reli-
ant upon short-term wholesale funding. Despite this, Hector Sants made clear that RBS were not in breach 
of threshold conditions. 195 In the light of this Hector Sants was of the view that the FSA had no power to in-
tervene.196 This view was challenged by Sir David Walker, who considered that the FSA could have set a 
capital buffer for the combined entity merged together that would have made the merger unattractive com-
mercially.197 The conclusion was that the FSA was not making full or proper use of its powers.198 The wit-
nesses for the FSA were never called back to either challenge or agree with this conclusion, which might 
have been done and perhaps leads to a weakness in that the issue is not ultimately, clearly determined. The 
FSA Board Report made the point, without conclusively accepting it -- that "Arguably the FSA, if really de-
termined, could have blocked the takeover by other less direct means".199 Also, the FSA Board Report sug-
gests a similar possible approach, in that: "Irrespective of the formal position, however, it is arguable that the 
FSA could and should have used other mechanisms to prevent the acquisition".200 
Whilst the FSA Report "questioned"201 the FSA's approach in not creating a team to review the risks con-
nected with the RBS acquisition of ABN AMRO, the expert appointed by Parliament was much more critical. 
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In particular, more should have been done by the FSA in its examination of the risks connected with the 
merger.202 
 
3. Direct evidence of Lord Turner, Hector Sants and Margaret Cole of the FSA before 
the Treasury Committee 
 
Hector Sants, in response to question 117, indicated that there was no formal requirement for the FSA to 
approve the acquisition by RBS of ABN AMRO.203 Hector Sants went on to say that "the only basis under 
which we could have intervened would be if we had concluded that the bank, on completion of the transac-
tion, would not meet the threshold conditions".204 This was not accepted by the expert reviewer, Sir David 
Walker but the difference of view necessarily remains untested.205 In such a situation it is suggested that the 
regulator witness should be briefly brought back to clarify whether he/she still maintains their previous view 
or whether they now agree the approach of the expert. 
Hector Sants and Lord Turner were called to give evidence before the Treasury Committee.206 In response to 
question 
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95, Hector Sants indicated that he would like to see changes to the regulatory framework so that if in the fu-
ture individuals in positions as senior executives running a bank made a number of misjudgements (serial 
misjudgements) "which means that they are not fit to run a regulated institution ... which demonstrates they 
are not competent", the FSA (the regulator) would be able to take action against them. Lord Turner, in re-
sponse to question 97, indicated that any enforcement action, according to the best advice of "our enforce-
ment lawyers", would have to show a lack of technical ability of the individual in a very specific way or that 
the senior executive did not follow a particular procedure. In the view of Lord Turner, the fact that a senior 
executive made a number of misjudgements, as the law then stood, would not be sufficient for the FSA to 
take action and subsequently win an appeal before the courts.207 
 
4. Enforcement action(s) and the internal report of the FSA relating to RBS 
 
The internal report of the FSA, discussed above,208 deals with the enforcement division's work relating to 
whether it would be able to bring disciplinary action(s) for misconduct relating to the collapse of RBS. The 
enforcement division decided not to proceed with enforcement action.209 In order to proceed with enforce-
ment it would be necessary to show actions which were dishonest, reckless or incompetent.210 The enforce-
ment division wanted to investigate whether the RBS board had been fully involved in the decision process 
relating to the acquisition of ABN AMRO and whether it had received sufficient information to determine 
whether to proceed with the acquisition.211 Whilst the decision to proceed with the acquisition was a "bad"212 
decision it was not as a consequence of fraud or dishonesty.213 
The internal report specifically deals with the acquisition of ABN AMRO by RBS which it calls a "misjudge-
ment or catastrophic consequences".214 The enforcement division of the FSA concluded that the due dili-
gence by RBS was insufficient215 and it was limited by lack of access to the balance sheet of ABN AMRO.216 
The advice from the solicitors acting for RBS was that the RBS board had given the takeover adequate con-
sideration.217 The RBS board was also advised by its solicitors as to whether it could exercise its material 
adverse change clause in the light of general market deterioration, but RBS still wished to proceed with the 
acquisition of ABN AMRO. The FSA took into account the fact that this advice had been obtained.218 The 
internal report then continues by summarising why the FSA did not take enforcement action in relation to the 
ABN AMRO acquisition. There was no evidence that "knowingly inaccurate or unreliable due diligence in-
formation was presented to or withheld from the Board"219 or that board members had been pressurised into 
approving the acquisition.220 Indeed, relevant legal advice had been obtained by the board221 and the due 
diligence findings were "transparently communicated to investors".222 In the light of the above a successful 
enforcement action was felt not to be possible and the deficiencies would not be sufficient for a successful 
enforcement action.223 
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Issues relating to capital, risk, asset quality, and stress testing, have been considered throughout and feature 
in the various case situations. The internal report of the FSA does state that the FSA did consider whether it 
should take enforcement action(s) in relation to RBS's systems and controls relating to its capital position.224 
RBS did not break the rules relating to capital so there was no substantive breach.225 However, the controls 
of RBS in relation to capital may have been inadequate as it did not know whether it had broken its capital 
requirements.226 This was regarded by the FSA as a process breach.227 The enforcement division consid-
ered, in the light of the above, that it would not be appropriate to take action.228 Further, such approach "was 
consistent with the approach that the FSA took at the time -- i.e. it was aware of the matter and chose to ad-
dress it by means other than enforcement".229 
It is possible to argue, in a general sense, that the lack of effective regulation may have had a knock-on ef-
fect. It is possible to suggest, though difficult to prove, that the regulator was reluctant to take enforcement 
action230 against any senior individuals within defaulting banks as it would expose the regulator's lack of ac-
tion(s). Furthermore, such individuals might be able to mount an effective defence simply based upon the 
lack of actions taken by the regulator. The defence would be to the effect that as you the regulator did not 
require us to take certain actions, such as say stress testing, how can you now complain and seek to impose 
liability upon individuals within the bank for not stress testing? What is known is that there was almost a 
complete lack of enforcement action involving fines or bans against any senior management in Northern 
Rock, HBOS, and RBS.231 
It is suggested that the FSA should have been more dynamic in its approach and should have tested the 
matter at a high level in the court system. If the FSA's view was shown to be correct then it would be able to 
say to Parliament that new powers were required. At least it would be able to confirm to the public that it 
genuinely was not able to act and placate public concerns about its lack of action. 
 
5. Evaluation of the parliamentary report on RBS 
 
A third report by Parliament again suggested that the lessons may not have been learnt by the FSA. The 
takeover by ABN AMRO by RBS reduced the capital and liquidity of RBS. This was not stress tested by the 
bank or by the FSA despite two major, previous, reports of Parliament which identified the importance of li-
quidity. Again, despite the importance of this report it has received comparatively little attention in the legal 
academic literature. Matters of substance and the actual risks being taken by RBS were not fully examined. 
Interestingly, the FSA incorrectly considered that it did not have power to intervene. It is crucial, particularly 
from a legal perspective that the regulator is clear as to its powers and is comfortable as to their use. Large 
banks will necessarily be well advised legally and in this case, this was a further reason put forward by the 
FSA for not taking action. However this balance of power between regulator and economically powerful bank 
has again not been the subject of much sociological discussion in legal academic circles and will not be dis-
cussed at length or further in this article.232 
[2015] 9(2) LFMR 130-144 at  140 
 
6. Enforcement action 
 
There has been some evidence of legal activity in relation to disciplinary and other actions against individu-
als233 and some reported case law.234 The decision in Pottage v FSA235 in which the FSA was directed by the 
Court of Appeal not to take action against Mr Pottage perhaps indicates that a regulator might face difficulties 
in pursuing regulatory actions against individuals employed in senior management positions. 236 There is to 
be a report by the FCA/PRA in relation to the failure by HBOS and the review will have scope to "assess the 
reasonableness of the scope of the FSA's enforcement investigations in relation to the failure of HBOS".237 
The review will receive an opinion from counsel238 and will "consider afresh whether any other former mem-
bers of HBOS's senior management should be subject to an investigation with a view to prohibition proceed-
ings".239 
 
I. Libor 
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Although this situation does not concern the failure of a particular bank, the comments of the Commons 
Treasury Committee do indicate quite clearly that that committee did regard the Libor situation as raising 
matters of prudential regulation. The scandal of the alleged fixing of Libor, with its effects upon interest rates 
is the subject of ongoing criminal investigation. In its wake senior management within Barclays resigned and 
were called to give evidence before the House of Commons Treasury Committee.240 The Committee not only 
considered the failings of senior management within Barclays, but also looked at the role of the FSA and 
whether it had acted appropriately. The House of Commons Treasury Committee concluded there were fail-
ings in the approach and effectiveness of the FSA in its prudential regulation. The FSA was two years behind 
the investigations being carried out by the US regulatory authorities in starting formal investigations.241 Fur-
ther, such delay was a contributing factor in the perceived weakness of London as a regulator of its financial 
markets.242 The Committee also concluded that there were "shortcomings" on the part of the FSA.243 In par-
ticular, that the FSA, as prudential regulator, failed to appreciate the importance of market rumours relating 
to the manipulation of Libor.244 The fact that there were concerns on the part of House of Commons Treasury 
Committee about the FSA simply as a prudential regulator in relation to the Libor issue indicates why this 
issue merits some consideration in this article.245 
Lord Turner in giving evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee, about the final notice in rela-
tion to the investigation of Barclays, made the comment that when he looked at paragraph 131 of the final 
notice someone from Barclays had said that Barclays were "being clean in principle, but we're ... not being 
clean clean".246 Lord Turner then asks himself a question -- "why didn't somebody [somebody within the FSA] 
put up a red flag?"247 The answer that Lord Turner gave to this question, that he asked himself, was that this 
statement from Barclays was one of many statements. 248 Second, this statement was only dealt with at jun-
ior level and never brought an important conclusion about the effect of self-regulation on the attitude of the 
regulator.249 
"I return to the fact that there was simply a mindset that if there were problems here it was for the BBA (Brit-
ish Bankers Association) to solve them." 
The British Bankers Association, operating through a private company was the organisation that was re-
sponsible for Libor. There was a system of self-regulation in place. The FSA had over-relied upon this 
self-regulatory system. In short, and in conclusion, it was a classic example illustrating "regulatory inertia" 
and a failure of self-regulation. The matter does not rest there for there are now allegations of similar type of 
collusion in relation to the Forex market, which is self-regulated, with a rate that is determined by traders. A 
small group250 of these traders are alleged to have made large profits by manipulation of this exchange rate. 
This situation has been described as "an unwelcome echo of the Libor benchmark interest rate manipula-
tion...".251 There have also been allegations that officials within the Bank of England were made aware of 
attempts to rig the market. It has been alleged that there was a failure to pass such concerns on to senior 
management. It is understood that one member of staff of the Bank of England has been suspended and a 
law firm called upon to conduct an independent investigation.252 
 
1. Turner Review 
 
Having just quoted from the mindset of Lord Turner above it is appropriate here to say a few things about the 
Turner Review.253 The failings and suggested reforms have been described elsewhere by others.254 However 
Lord Turner did identify several matters of particular relevance for this article. Discussing the FSA's supervi-
sory approach Lord Turner made clear certain particular failings: first an incorrect concentration by the FSA 
on systems and processes "rather than on challenging business models and strategies";255 
over-concentration on consumer matters rather than prudential matters;256 a "skewed" approach to Basel II 
and capital matters which "was mistaken since ... it meant that insufficient attention was paid to growing risks 
in trading books".257 Lord Turner was called before Parliament to give evidence before various committees, 
but he took the opportunity to answer and address the criticisms of Parliament about the prudential failings of 
the FSA in his own report. His admissions about over-concentration on capital matters at the expense of li-
quidity matters confirm his agreement to the criticisms of the regulation by the FSA of HBOS contained in the 
parliamentary commission's report on the failure of HBOS.258 The terms of reference of the HBOS review259 
by the FSA/PRA into the failure of HBOS Plc,260 has "scope"261 to "make any recommendations...that have 
Page 17 
 
not already been covered in the previous reports, specifically ... The Turner Review". The dialogue between 
Parliament and regulator continues. 
 
2. Evaluation -- in terms of responsiveness 
 
Professors Julia Black and Robert Baldwin have indicated262 the importance of risk assessment in order for 
the regulation to be responsive. In relation to Libor and the report of 
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Parliament, there was a specific finding by Parliament that the FSA failed to respond quickly. The Hampton 
Review263 and the book by Ayres and Braithwaite264 also confirm the need for risk assessment. The failings 
of the FSA described above were a failure of self-regulation. By definition it was also a failure to be respon-
sive, and responsive of the need to assess the risks being taken by banking institutions. The discussion in 
relation to RBS above shows two things in particular. First, that the error by the FSA concerning lack of su-
pervision of liquidity in relation to Northern Rock was repeated in relation to RBS. This shows a lack of re-
sponse and a failure by the FSA to change its approach speedily. Second, with RBS the FSA left it to RBS to 
stress test, and to stress test matters affecting liquidity. RBS did not do this properly or effectively, but the 
point is that it was a failure of self-regulation. A similar failure on the part of the FSA was shown with HBOS, 
where the assessment of risk was left to the bank by the FSA. This demonstrates another failure in 
self-regulation. With the analysis of the failure of regulation in the US (considered in the next section, section 
J below), it is established that there was a clear failure to take enforcement actions or proceedings by the 
regulators, even though the regulators did possess the necessary powers and knew exactly what was going 
on. 
Professors Julia Black and Robert Baldwin are also of the view that in order for there to be responsive regu-
lation, the regulator must have the appropriate tools.265 As regards individual enforcement action against par-
ticular individuals, the FSA has indicated that it believed that it did not have the necessary powers. This 
shows a lack of ability to be able to respond in a positive way. There was also a mindset not to take en-
forcement action and deal with breaches in other ways. 
 
J. A comparative analysis -- regulatory failure in the US 
 
An analysis of similar types of parliamentary reports from the US can and will be made. Again, the method-
ology is to search through the various congress and senate websites to see what reports have been made. 
One report of particular importance and relevance is the report of the United States Senate Permanent Sub 
Committee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Wall Street and 
The Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse Majority and Minority Staff Report Permanent Sub 
Committee on Investigations (United States Senate, 13 April 2011).266 The subsequent discussion draws 
from information contained in this important report. The report does analyse and reach important conclusions 
about prudential regulation in the United States of America from 2004 onwards, and it will be this that will be 
focused upon. 
 
1. Washington Mutual Bank and failure by regulators to take enforcement action 
 
Part IV of the report deals mainly267 with regulatory failure and the collapse of Washington Mutual Bank re-
ferred in the report as "WaMu", which will be adopted in this article. There was the joint Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, the "FDIC".268 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was the primary regulator.269 The 
FDIC was a joint, secondary regulator because WaMu was an insured depository institution.270 WaMu col-
lapsed on 25 September 2008.271 It was placed into receivership by the OTS, and the FDIC, as receiver, sold 
it immediately to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 million.272 
The fundamental weakness in the prudential regulation of WaMu, according to the Senate report,273 was that 
despite the fact that over 500 weaknesses were identified by OTS examiners, between 2004 and 2008, not 
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one public enforcement action was taken against this bank, even though the bank failed to take action to 
correct these deficiencies.274 There were important consequences as a result of failings in the prudential reg-
ulation of WaMu, which, because of their importance, merit identification. WaMu was allowed by its regula-
tors to sell off hundreds of billions of dollars of its risky loans to other banks and financial institutions which 
was identified as being "a proximate cause of the financial crisis".275 Further, the OTS impeded the FDIC 
from being able to take enforcement action by rejecting the requests by the FDIC for access to loan files, 
thereby stopping the FDIC from being able to effectively review such files.276 The OTS, the primary federal 
regulator of WaMu, opposed FDIC wishes to take enforcement action.277 However, the FDIC entered into an 
arrangement, from 2002, with primary bank regulators, that if the primary regulator failed to take enforcement 
action then the FDIC would be able to initiate its own enforcement actions concerning insured institutions.278 
The OTS handbook requires the OTS to undertake proactive regulatory supervision.279 All the federal regu-
lators, which include the OTS, used the CAMELS system covering Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Man-
agement, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.280 The regulators have various levels of re-
sponse: first, an observation, which is a finding of weakness not of regulatory concern; second, recommen-
dations, which are included in the formal report and which are followed up and reviewed subsequently; third, 
criticisms, which are matters of primary concern requiring corrective action and are subject to follow up by 
examiners, and if not corrected may result in stronger corrective action; fourth, a matter requiring immediate 
board attention. 281 However, the OTS did not object to WaMu's high risk lending strategy, even though 
WaMu had not presented any plan to manage this greater risk.282 
 
 
"WaMu had sold or securitized the majority of the loans it had originated or purchased, undermining 
the U.S. home loan mortgage market with hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality 
loans. OTS documentation shows that WaMu's regulators saw what was happening, identified the 
problems, but then took no enforcement actions to protect either Washington Mutual or the U.S. finan-
cial system from the bank's shoddy lending practices."283 
 
 
 
WaMu had, from 2004 to 2006, a 2 CAMELS rating.284 The FDIC supported a 2 CAMELS rating throughout 
2007.285 On 1 August 2008, the FDIC wanted the OTS to downgrade 
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WaMu to a 4 CAMELS rating (a rating which would be that WaMu was engaging in unsound and unsafe 
practices) which the OTS did not wish to do. In September 2008 the FDIC did downgrade WaMu to a 4 
CAMELS rating. However, on 25 September the OTS shut WaMu and the FDIC, as receiver, sold WaMu to 
JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 million dollars. 
The report indicates throughout, concerns about WaMu by the OTS, but failure by WaMu to take steps to 
alter its behaviour, and failure by the OTS to compel performance of improvement.286 The report quotes from 
the evidence of John Rymer, FDIC Inspector General, who was of the view that "I don't think forceful enough 
action was taken".287 WaMu's risk officer, Ronald Cathcart explained that the approach of the OTS was one 
of self-regulation:288 "I would say that the OTS did believe in self-regulation." 
WaMu's risk officer from 2004 to 2005 gave evidence that examiners of the OTS received little support from 
senior management. When an OTS official sought to stop WaMu from granting mortgages when WaMu did 
not verify the incomes of the respective borrowers, senior management within the OTS did not allow action to 
be taken.289 "What I cannot explain is why the superiors in the agencies didn't take a tougher tone with the 
banks given the degree of ... negative findings ... By a more active stance, I mean putting the bans under 
letters of agreement and forcing change." One reason for this was that the OTS simply looked at short-term 
profits. When the profits from mortgage lending were high during the property boom, the OTS used this as an 
excuse for allowing WaMu to engage in risky lending practices and for ignoring the systemic implications of 
WaMu's conduct.290 
 
2. Countrywide Financial Corporation 
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Similarly, no enforcement actions were taken against Countrywide Financial Corporation by the OTS.291 
When the sub-prime mortgage crisis hit the US, it was not able to securitise its mortgage lending, and it was 
sold to the Bank of America for $2.8 million before it went into liquidation.292 
 
3. IndyMac Bank 
 
As with WaMu, a high CAMELS rating was given by the OTS to IndyMac Bank despite sloppy mortgage ap-
praisal practices by the bank, poor underwriting, and improper risk mitigation.293 No public enforcement ac-
tions were taken by the OTS.294 The OTS was aware of the bank's problems.295 The report refers to a review 
by the Treasury Inspector General296 which concluded that the OTS "did not take sufficient enforcement ac-
tion".297 The collapse of IndyMac Bank, which was insured by the FDIC, resulted in a payout from the fund of 
$10.7 billion.298 
The conclusion was that there were a number of regulatory failures and "WaMu's collapse marked one of the 
most spectacular failures of federal bank regulators in recent history".299 The Dodd-Frank Act abolished the 
OTS and its duties and personnel were transferred to a new institution, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC).300 In some ways, this mirrors what happened in the UK: the abolition of the FSA and the 
transfer of its powers and personnel to the FCA/PRA.301 The PRA is now specifically responsible for pruden-
tial regulation. Previously with the FSA, there was no specific divide of that sort so that the FSA was struc-
turally not set up to regulate prudentially.302 
 
4. Conclusion that regulators in the US deliberately failed to take action 
 
The written statement (testimony) of Orice M Williams, Director Financial Markets and Community Invest-
ment, of the United States Government Accountability Office, Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insur-
ance and Investments, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Senate -- Financial Regula-
tion Review of Regulators' Oversight of Risk Management Systems at a Limited Number of Large, Complex 
Financial Institutions, 18 March 2009303 confirms the view that the regulators did not take sufficient action. 
Throughout this statement, the comment is that the regulators did not fully appreciate the risks or weak-
nesses of the institutions being regulated304 and "relied on management representation of risk"305 which was 
inaccurate. There is also the comment that regulators failed to take sufficient action to remedy the deficien-
cies of which they were aware.306 "We found that the regulator continued to find some of the same weak-
nesses in subsequent examination reports, yet examiners did not take forceful action to require the institution 
to address these shortcomings ...".307 There is a section in the statement headed "Regulators Identified 
Weaknesses in Models Used to Calculate Risk but May Not Have Acted on These Findings".308 In a later part 
of the statement, there are comments about the failure of the US regulatory authorities to take action when 
they were aware of failure: 
 
 
"We found that regulators had identified numerous weaknesses in stress testing at large institutions 
before the financial crisis. However, our limited review did not identify any instances in which an insti-
tution's lack of worst-case scenario testing prompted regulators to push forcefully for institutional ac-
tions to better understand and manage risks..."309 
 
 
 
K. Comparison between UK and US regulatory failure 
 
We have just seen with WaMu, that the bank massively expanded its lending. WaMu was careless in the way 
that it lent by allowing borrowers to verify their incomes and also in failing to verify incomes of its borrowers. 
The consequence was that it needed to sell off its loans through securitisation. Similarly with HBOS, in the 
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UK, the bank greatly expanded its lending, and had lax controls in relation to that lending. Although HBOS 
was involved in the securitisation of its loans, it was dependent on wholesale funding. 
However, the US regulatory authorities seemed more aware of what was happening but lacked the willing-
ness and desire to take any decisive action. In legal terms, perhaps the US regulators wilfully and recklessly 
turned a blind eye to what was going on. In contrast, there was 
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perhaps more dialogue between regulator and bank in the UK. HBOS stress tested as requested by the FSA. 
The failing in this approach was that HBOS did not stress test for a complete ending of all funding from the 
wholesale funding markets. This was an inadvertent failing by both HBOS and regulator. This failing on the 
part of the regulator might be classified as essentially one of negligence. The report of the FSA in relation to 
RBS also confirms a failure of regulation in the sense of negligence, in that the FSA failed to analyse rele-
vant risks. 
 
1. Confirmation of failings by the FSA 
 
It might be possible to reduce bank failures by having very great regulatory input. This might stifle lending as 
banks might have to massively increase their capital or retain larger parts of it. The other extreme approach 
would be to have no system of regulation. How much risk taking a regulator should allow cannot be an-
swered simply.310 The PRA needs to know what risks banks are subject to and be "... fully appraised of what 
these risks are"311 and that banks "have adequate systems in place...".312 These are obvious practical steps 
that need to be taken. 
The problem is that the statutory system of regulation, previously undertaken by the FSA, now by the PRA 
(particularly the PRA as prudential regulator) and the FCA, does not make clear what the approach should 
be. Though the Financial Services Act 2012 added a new statutory objective of financial stability, this is not 
enough for it does not address the issue of risk. The parliamentary reports have been critical about the lack 
of regulation and lack of effectiveness on the part of the FSA. The failures of the FSA show a lack of desire 
within the FSA to investigate matters relating to risk which the FSA believed to be outside its ambit. As was 
made clear in relation to the RBS collapse, the FSA did not have the resources to investigate all the banks 
under its remit. 
In the UK, the regulator did not fully appreciate the risks that the particular bank was subject to. As regards 
Northern Rock and HBOS, the FSA failed, twice, to stress test for the complete collapse of the wholesale 
markets. As regards the takeover of ABN AMRO by RBS, the FSA underestimated the risks to which RBS 
would be subject. This takeover was funded by debt not equity, and allowed to be funded in this way by the 
FSA. This put RBS into liquidity difficulties, which, again, might have been avoided. The FSA has stated in 
public, before Parliament, that it incorrectly concentrated on capital matters at the expense of liquidity issues. 
As regards Libor, the FSA delayed its response. The reports of Parliament confirm a pattern of failure on the 
part of the FSA. In the UK, there were failures, in the negligent sense, to take appropriate action. Parliament 
has requested the FSA to make internal reports to identify its failures so that these errors can be identified, 
learnt about, and not repeated. 
In the US, the regulators knew that particular banks were taking excessive risk, involving large amounts of 
mortgage lending, but chose not to take action. It was as if the regulators, in the US, did not want to regulate 
but wanted the banks to self-regulate instead. In the US, the regulators deliberately, wilfully and recklessly 
turned a blind eye to what was going on. The massive securitisation of mortgage lending was ignored by the 
OTS, who had specifically identified this as a problem. In both countries, for different reasons, decisive action 
was not taken. However in both the UK and the US it has been demonstrated that regulators were acting 
carelessly or recklessly. 
 
2. Reform in the UK 
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In theory, the PRA is responsible for day-to-day regulation and the FCA is responsible for taking action in 
relation to the enforcement of this prudential regulation. The advantage of having these two bodies within the 
Bank of England is that day-to-day regulation (prudential regulation) can be combined with general mac-
ro-economic regulation, and there is one organisation monitoring both. The separation of powers between 
the FCA and the PRA is clear in principle. Indeed, it makes sense for the PRA to investigate and decide that 
a particular institution is acting in breach of the rules and for the FCA to then bring action before the court. 
This separation of powers in this context protects the regulatory bodies from arguments that the human 
rights of the bank have been infringed. The reforms mean a specialised organisation, the PRA, can deal with 
prudential regulation and that conduct matters can be dealt with by the FCA.313 This should enable the PRA 
to focus better on matters relating to risk. This means that there are a substantial number of employees 
dealing with prudential matters. It also means that the focus of these employees can be on prudential regula-
tion. Previously, the FSA actually focused on consumer conduct matters and not prudential matters.314 These 
structural changes should have some beneficial effects upon prudential regulation. Perhaps there has been 
too little discussion on the effect of changes in legislation that have had an effect upon risk evaluation by the 
regulator. The new objective of financial stability315 is important for this reason. A regulator is likely to give 
additional attention to those banks that are of greater economic importance even if their risk profile does not 
justify it. Indeed, the too big to fail issue is likely to dictate this.316 The consequences of a too big to fail bank 
actually failing may be so highly unpredictable that a regulator will simply not allow it to happen at almost any 
cost.317 However, the introduction of legislation providing for deposit protection could encourage the regulator 
to pay less attention as depositors would be protected in a regulatory environment that can never provide 
complete protection.318 
 
3. Approach of the PRA after the abolition of the FSA -- new wine in new bottles 
 
The PRA has wanted banking institutions to act in a responsible way. There have been criticisms made by 
Parliament that some banks took excessive risks in relation to their lending before the banking collapse. The 
PRA has issued a statement319 about the need for a culture change on the part of banks. Firms are expected 
to act prudently. The problem with such an approach is that banks have increasingly become larger and 
larger entities keen on maximising their profits and paying little heed to the risks that this poses. 
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This article is not the place to analyse the distinctions between principle and rule based regulation. This has 
been done elsewhere by others.320 The distinction may be less clear if the rules are "rounded off" and the 
principles "sharpened". 321 The rulebook has been described by one academic as "conspicuously principles 
based".322 What is clear is that the PRA is to replace the six principles for business used by the FSA with 
nine fundamental principles.323 Rule 1,324 that a firm must conduct its affairs with integrity is very similar to 
the previous rule used by the FSA.325 Rule 2326 of the PRA, that a firm must act with due skill, care and dili-
gence, is as the new rulebook states, simply a "shortened"327 version of the previous rule used by the FSA. 
There is however a "new"328 rule, fundamental rule 3 introduced by the PRA that the firms must act in a pru-
dent manner. In mandatory language it provides that firms "must demonstrate sound judgement and exercise 
caution".329 Fundamental rule 4, the maintenance of adequate financial resources,330 is again similar to the 
previous principle of the FSA. The FSA had previously required firms to have adequate risk management 
systems and this is confirmed by fundamental rule 5331 that firms must put in place risk management systems 
and also sound and effective strategies regarding risk. Further, firms must be able to demonstrate clear 
strategies for the identification of risks. The rule is there to deal with weaknesses of the risk management of 
banks that led to the financial crisis. Whether this upgrading of the rulebook is enough to stop some future 
crisis remains to be seen. There are further rules under the rulebook. Fundamental rule 6332 requires firms to 
have proper internal governance and for that purpose it must organise and control its affairs effectively and 
responsibly. The FCA considers that in order to comply with this rule firms must have senior management 
and directors who are fit and proper to carry on the firm's business. The responsibilities of each must be 
clear as well as the apportionment of responsibilities between each. The subsequent fundamental rules, 7, 8 
and 9 deal with matters other than the day-to-day management of firms and will not be considered. 
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The PRA has indicated333 that its approach to prudential regulation is that it now places "greater emphasis on 
certain criteria than was the case with the FSA".334 Further, when the PRA supervises firms, it supervises 
them in order to determine whether they are acting in a manner that is safe and sound.335 When assessing 
this the PRA has regard to the firm's potential impact upon the financial stability of the financial system.336 
Furthermore, the PRA has indicated that it examines a firm's business model to determine if it could ad-
versely affect other firms participating within the financial system.337 Thus, there is to be a substantive 
change, which needs to be separate from organisational changes and staff increases.338 Such changes are 
necessary and desirable. However, despite all these changes to prudential regulation above, the ARROW 
system relating to risk appears to still be firmly in place.339 The changes to the rules above are not insignifi-
cant but again it will be up to the PRA to effectively enforce them and carry out what it says it will do. The 
rules are not enough in themselves. 
We had, at least in theory, a system of prudential regulation under the FSA and we continue to have a sys-
tem of prudential regulation under the PRA. The rulebook requires banks to act in a prudent manner and for 
the PRA to be proactive in the ways mentioned above. If both play their part, and carry out the above duties, 
then the lessons of the recent financial crisis may finally have been learnt, particularly as regards proactive 
and effective prudential regulation. If not, then another catastrophe may yet strike again. Further, the PRA 
must be prepared to tackle multinational banks that do not adhere to its risk taking strategy340 and not be 
deterred from so doing by their size and economic power. 
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